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ABSTRACT
Static and dynamic binary analysis techniques are actively used
to reverse engineer software’s behavior and to detect its vulnera-
bilities, even when only the binary code is available for analysis.
To avoid analysis errors due to misreading op-codes for a wrong
CPU architecture, these analysis tools must precisely identify the
Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) of the object code under anal-
ysis. The variety of CPU architectures that modern security and
reverse engineering tools must support is ever increasing due to
massive proliferation of IoT devices and the diversity of firmware
and malware targeting those devices. Recent studies concluded that
falsely identifying the binary code’s ISA caused alone about 10% of
failures of IoT firmware analysis. The state of the art approaches to
detect ISA for arbitrary object code look promising – their results
demonstrate effectiveness and high-performance. However, they
lack the support of publicly available datasets and toolsets, which
makes the evaluation, comparison, and improvement of those tech-
niques, datasets, and machine learning models quite challenging
(if not impossible). This paper bridges multiple gaps in the field of
automated and precise identification of architecture and endianness
of binary files and object code. We develop from scratch the toolset
and datasets that are lacking in this research space. As such, we
contribute a comprehensive collection of open data, open source,
and open API web-services. We also attempt experiment reconstruc-
tion and cross-validation of effectiveness, efficiency, and results
of the state of the art methods. When training and testing classi-
fiers using solely code-sections from executable binary files, all
our classifiers performed equally well achieving over 98% accuracy.
The results are consistent and comparable with the current state
of the art, hence supports the general validity of the algorithms,
features, and approaches suggested in those works. Complementing
the field, we propose using complete binaries in either testing or
training&testing mode – experiments show that ISA of complete
binary files is identified with 99.2% accuracy using Random Forest
classifier.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Software reverse engineering; •
Computing methodologies → Machine learning; Artificial
intelligence; • Computer systems organization → Embedded
and cyber-physical systems; • Software and its engineering →
Software creation and management;
∗This paper is based on author’s MSc thesis [28].
KEYWORDS
Binary code analysis, Firmware analysis, Instruction Set Archi-
tecture (ISA), Supervised Machine Learning, Reverse engineering,
Malware analysis, Digital forensics,
1 INTRODUCTION
Reverse engineering and analysis of binary code has a wide spec-
trum of applications [33, 46, 51], ranging from vulnerability re-
search [6, 11, 12, 45, 55] to binary patching and translation [48],
and from digital forensics [10] to anti-malware and Intrusion De-
tection Systems (IDS) [34, 53]. For such applications, various static
and dynamic analysis techniques and tools are constantly being
researched, developed, and improved [5, 8, 19, 33, 39, 49, 54].
Regardless of their end goal, one of the important steps in these
techniques is to correctly identify the Instruction Set Architecture
(ISA) of the op-codes within the binary code. Some techniques
can perform the analysis using architecture-independent or cross-
architecture methods [20, 21, 42]. However, many of those tech-
niques still require the exact knowledge of the binary code’s ISA.
For example, recent studies concluded that falsely identifying the
binary code’s ISA caused about 10% of failures of IoT/embedded
firmware analysis [11, 12].
Sometimes the CPU architecture is available in the executable
format’s header sections, for example in ELF file format [2]. How-
ever, this information is not guaranteed to be universally available
for analysis. There are multiple reasons for this and we will detail a
few of them. The advances in Internet of Things (IoT) technologies
bring to the game an extreme variety of hardware and software, in
particular new CPU architectures, new OSs or OS-like systems [37].
Many of those devices are resource-constrained and the binary
code comes without sophisticated headers and OS abstraction lay-
ers. At the same time, the digital forensics and the IDSs sometimes
may have access only to a fraction of the code, e.g., from an ex-
ploit (shell-code), malware trace, or a memory dump. For example,
many shell-codes are exactly this – a quite short, formatless and
headerless sequence of CPU op-codes for a target system (i.e., a
combination of hardware, operating-system, and abstraction lay-
ers) that performs a presumably malicious action on behalf of the
attacker [23, 43]. In such cases, though possible in theory, it is quite
unlikely that the full code including the headers specifying CPU
ISA will be available for analysis. Finally, even in the traditional
computing world of (e.g., x86/x86_64), there are situations where
the hosts contain object code for CPU architectures other than
the one of the host itself. Examples include firmware for network
cards [4, 16, 17], various management co-processors [36], and de-
vice drivers [7, 27] for USB [38, 52] and other embedded devices that
contain own specialized processors and provide specific services
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(e.g., encryption, data codecs) that are implemented as peripheral
firmware [14, 32]. Even worse, more often than not the object code
for such peripheral firmware is stored using less traditional or non-
standard file formats and headers (if any), or embedded inside the
device drivers themselves resulting in mixed architectures code
streams.
Currently, several state of the art works try to address the chal-
lenge of accurately identifying the CPU ISA for arbitrary object code
sequences [10, 15]. Their approaches look promising as the results
demonstrate effectiveness and high-performance. However, they
lack the support of publicly available datasets and toolsets, which
makes the evaluation, comparison, and improvement of those tech-
niques, datasets, and machine learning models quite challenging (if
not impossible).
With this paper, we bridgemultiple gaps in the field of automated
and precise identification of architecture and endianness of binary
files and object code. We develop from scratch the toolset and
datasets that are lacking in this research space. To this end, we
release a comprehensive collection of open data, open source, and
open API web-services. We attempt experiment reconstruction and
cross-validation of effectiveness, efficiency, and results of the state
of the art methods [10, 15], as well as propose and experimentally
validate new approaches to the main classification challenge where
we obtain consistently comparable, and in some scenarios better,
results. The results we obtain in our extensive set of experiments
are consistent and comparable with prior art, hence supports the
general validity and soundness of both existing and newly proposed
algorithms, features, and approaches.
1.1 Contributions
In this paper, we present the following contributions:
a) First and foremost contribution is that we implement and
release as open source the code and toolset necessary to re-
construct and re-run the experiments from this paper as well
as from the state of the art works of Clemens [10] and De
Nicolao et al. [15]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first such toolset to be publicly released.
b) Second and equally important contribution is that we release
as open data the machine learning models and data necessary
to both validate our results and expand further the datasets
and the research field. To the best of our knowledge, this
is both the first and the largest dataset of this type to be
publicly released.
c) Third valuable contribution is that we propose, evaluate and
validate the use of “complete binaries” when training the
classifiers (as opposed to current “code-sections”-only ap-
proaches [10, 15]). We achieve a 99.2% classification accuracy
when testing with Random Forest classifiers implemented
in Azure Machine Learning platform.
d) Last but not least, we perform and present the first inde-
pendent study that attempts experiment reconstruction and
cross-validation of results, effectiveness and efficiency of
state of the art methods (Clemens [10], De Nicolao et al. [15]).
e) We release both the dataset and the toolset as open source
and open data, and are accessible at: https://github.com/
kairis/
1.2 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review the related
work in Section 2. Then we detail our methodology, experimental
setups and datasets in Section 3. We provide a detailed analysis of
results in Section 4. Finally, we discuss future work and conclude
with Section 5.
2 RELATEDWORK
McDaniel and Heydari [35] introduced the idea to use file contents
to identify the file type. Previous methods utilized metadata such
as fixed file extension, fixed "magic numbers" and proprietary de-
scriptive file wrappers. The authors showed that many file types
have characteristic patterns that can be used to differentiate them
from other file formats. They used byte frequency analysis, byte
frequency cross-correlation analysis and file header/trailer analysis,
and reported accuracies ranging from 23% to 96% depending on
the algorithm used. A lot of research has utilized the difference in
byte frequencies when classifying file types [3, 22, 30, 31, 41, 50, 56].
Clemens [10] applied the techniques introduced by McDaniel and
Heydari [35] and proposed methods for classifying object code with
its target architecture and endianness. The author used byte-value
histograms combined with signatures to train different classifiers
using supervisedmachine learning. This approach produced promis-
ing results and showed that machine learning can be an effective
tool when classifying architecture of object code. Classification ac-
curacy varied depending on the used classifier from 92.2% to 98.4%.
The authors proposed future research ideas for a larger data set,
which would include more architectures and code samples compiled
with different compilers. De Nicolao et al. [15] extend the work of
Clemens [10] as part of their research by adding more signatures
to use as an input for the classifier. They obtain a global accuracy
of 99.8% with logistic regression, which is higher than previously
demonstrated by Clemens [10]. For further research, they propose
to incorporate instruction-level features such as trying to group
bytes corresponding to code into valid instructions. In a slightly
different direction, Costin et al. [12] go through every executable
inside the firmware and use ELF headers to identify the architecture
if the header is present. The authors determine the architecture
of the firmware by counting the amount of architecture specific
binaries the firmware contains. This information is used to launch
an emulator for that specific architecture. cpu_rec [24] uses the fact
that the probability distribution of one byte depends on the value
of the previous one and can detect 72 code architectures [25]. The
author uses Markov chains and Kullback-Leibler divergence for
classification. A sliding window is used to handle files with code
for multiple architectures in them. The author does not publish any
performance measures other than that the analysis of 1 MB takes
60 seconds on 1GB of RAM. Angr static analysis framework [46]
includes the Boyscout tool. It leverages static signatures to identify
the CPU architecture executable files. Boyscout tries to match the
file to a set of signatures containing the byte patterns of function
prologues and epilogues for known and surveyed architectures.
One of the limitations of such an approach is that the signatures re-
quire maintenance. The performance of the classification is highly
dependent on keeping those signatures up-to-date, complete and
highly-qualitative, which can be challenging. Also, this technique
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Figure 1: The workflow of our toolset to download and pre-
pare the datasets.
can be less effective for heavily optimized code which is many times
the case with the resource-constrained IoT/embedded devices. Bin-
walk [1] uses architecture-specific features (totalling 33 signatures
for 9 CPU architectures) along with Capstone disassembler [44]
(having 9 configurations for 4 CPU architectures) to identify object
code’s architecture 1. Using only signatures has some limitations
as for example they can lead to false positives if the signatures are
not unique compared to other architectures in the dataset [10]. In
addition to that, the disassembly method requires complete sup-
port from a disassembler framework, which might not always be
available or working perfectly. Costin et al. [13] were the first to
apply machine learning in the context of firmware classification.
They try to automate finding the brand and the model of the device
the firmware is made for and propose different firmware features
and machine learning algorithms to get this information. The re-
searchers achieve the best results with random forest classifier with
90% classification accuracy. With the help of statistical confidence
interval, the authors estimate that in a data set of 172 000 firmware
images, the classifier could correctly classify the firmware in 93.5%
±4.3% of the cases.
3 DATASETS AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
3.1 Datasets
We started with the dataset acquisition challenge. Despite the exis-
tence of several state of the art works, unfortunately neither their
datasets nor the toolsets are publicly available. 2 To overcome this
limitation we had to develop a complete toolset and pipeline that
are able to optimally download a dataset that is both large and
representative enough. We release our data acquisition toolset as
open source. The pipeline used to acquire our dataset is depicted in
Figure 1, while sample code snippets are listed in Appendix 6 3.
We chose the Debian Linux repositories for several reasons. First,
it is a long established and trusted project, therefore a good source
of software packages and related data. Second, it is bootstrapped
from the same tools and sources to build the Linux kernel and
userspace software packages for a very diverse set of CPU and ABI
architectures.
The downloaded and pre-processed dataset can be summarized
as follows: about 1600 ISO/Jigdo files taking up around 1843 GB;
approximately 79000 DEB package files taking up about 36 GB;
around 105000 ELF files taking up about 29 GB; about 105000 ELF
1Last checked on 20.4.2019.
2A post-processed dataset from Clemens [10] was generously provided by the author
privately on request. The dataset is not publicly available.
3Due to space limitation, only a part of the code is listed in this submission.
Table 1: Dataset details in terms of filesystem size and file
counts.
Type Approx. # of files in dataset Approx. total size
.iso files ~1600 ~1843 GB
.deb files ~79000 ~36 GB
ELF files 105000 ~29 GB
ELF code sections 105000 ~17 GB
code sections taking up approximately 17 GB. A detailed breakdown
of our dataset and sample-sets is in Table 2.
Our dataset covers 23 distinct architectures, which is inline with
and comparable to Clemens [10] (20 architectures) and De Nicolao
et al. [15] (21 architectures). Most of the CPU architectures over-
lap with existing works, but there are few new ones (as marked
in Table 2). At the same time, the sample-sets used in our experi-
ments have some significant differences compared to the state of
the art. First, the total number of 67285 samples in our experiments
is several times larger than those used by both Clemens [10] (16785
samples) and De Nicolao et al. [15] (15290 samples). Second, com-
pared to existing works, our sample-set size per architecture is
both larger and more balanced. Using more balanced sample-sets
should give more accurate results when evaluating and compar-
ing classifier performance, as imbalance of classes in the dataset
can cause sub-optimal classification performance [26]. When creat-
ing our sample-sets for each architecture, we had set forth several
constraints. On the one hand, we decided that the minimum code
section in the ELF file should be 4000 bytes (4K), as this is the code
size where all classifiers were shown to converge and provide high-
accuracy at the same time (see Fig.2 in Clemens [10]). On the other
hand, we wanted to have the sample-sets as balanced as possible
between all the architectures. Given these parameters, from the
initial 105013 ELF files in the download dataset, our toolset filtered
67285 samples with an approximate average of 3000 samples per
architecture sample-set (Table 2). Importantly, our toolset can be
parametrized to download more files, and to filter the sample-sets
based on different criteria as dictated by various use cases.
3.1.1 Discussion. An important point to clarify at this stage is the
reasoning and the implications of selecting the Debian repositories
as the source of code binaries, and the subsequent experimenta-
tion limited to ELF binaries. To the best of our knowledge Debian
package repositories are the only at this time that provide a years
long list of compiled binaries for such an extensive list of CPU and
hardware architectures. Certainly other repositories (e.g., Fedora,
Ubuntu, Raspbian) can also provide a good source of compiled bi-
naries, but in our experience and opinion they would only be able
to marginally improve the quality and the quantity of the ones
provided by the Debian repository. This may also be the reason
why other state of the art works relied on Debian repositories as
well [10, 15]. As a result of using the Debian packages as source
of code binaries, this inherently limited the datasets and the ex-
periments (both ours and ones in the state of the art [10, 15]) to
using only ELF format binaries. This however is not limiting or
impacting the experiments or applicability of the methods, since we
mainly work with the raw machine code (i.e., op-codes) extracted
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Table 2: Dataset details and statistics, summarized per architecture.
Architecture Sample-sets sizein experiment Wordsize Endianness File info
# of samples
in dataset
Size of samples
in dataset (GB)
alpha 3000 64 Little ELF 64-bit LSB executable, Alpha (unofficial) 4042 1.62
amd64 2994 64 Little ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64 6221 1.19
arm64 2997 64 Little ELF 64-bit LSB executable, ARM aarch64 4255 0.84
armel 2994 32 Little ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM 4621 0.86
armhf 2994 32 Little ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM 4618 0.70
hppa 3000 32 Big ELF 32-bit MSB executable, PA-RISC (LP64) 4909 1.48
i386 2994 32 Little ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386 6742 1.15
ia64 3000 64 Little ELF 64-bit LSB executable, IA-64 5046 2.75
m68k 3000 32 Big ELF 32-bit MSB executable, Motorola 68020 4440 1.17
mips † 2997 32 Big ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-II († upsampled) 418 1.00
mips64el ‡ 2998 64 Little ELF 64-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS64 rel2 (‡ new) 6430 2.61
mipsel 2994 32 Little ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-II 4396 1.01
powerpc 2110 32 Big ELF 32-bit MSB executable, PowerPC or cisco 4500 3672 1.29
powerpcspe ‡ 3000 32 Big ELF 32-bit MSB executable, PowerPC or cisco 4500 (‡ new) 3976 1.63
ppc64 2552 64 Big ELF 64-bit MSB executable, 64-bit PowerPC or cisco 7500 2900 1.75
ppc64el ‡ 2997 64 Little ELF 64-bit LSB executable, 64-bit PowerPC or cisco 7500 (‡ new) 4370 1.03
riscv64 ‡ 3000 64 Little ELF 64-bit LSB executable (‡ new) 4513 1.18
s390 2997 32 Big ELF 32-bit MSB executable, IBM S/390 5562 0.61
s390x 2994 64 Big ELF 64-bit MSB executable, IBM S/390 4169 1.03
sh4 3000 32 Little ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Renesas SH 6003 1.30
sparc 2997 32 Big ELF 32-bit MSB executable, SPARC32PLUS, V8+ Required 6111 0.62
sparc64 2676 64 Big ELF 64-bit MSB executable, SPARC V9, relaxed memory ordering 3338 1.37
x32 ‡ 3000 32 Little ELF 32-bit LSB executable, x86-64 (‡ new) 4261 1.56
Total 67285 – – – 105013 29.74 GB
solely from the code sections. Equivalent raw machine code can
be extracted in similarly easy ways from DOS MZ, COFF, PE32(+),
MACH-O, BFLT, and virtually any other executable binary format.
The only important condition is that, regardless of the binary file
format those op-codes come from, they must be extracted from code
sections which is a way to guarantee those op-code byte sequences
represent valid instructions for the CPU architecture they represent
(and which is specified in the binary format headers). Unfortunately,
we are unaware of any substantial collection of non-ELF binaries
that would cover an extensive list of CPU architectures. For exam-
ple, despite the fact the PE32 format supports well x86, x86-64, x64,
and added recently support for ARM thanks to Windows IoT for
Raspberry Pi (which has an ARM CPU), there is not much support
for other CPUs beyond that. To summarize, it is important to em-
phasize that the methods evaluated or presented in this paper are
not limited only to ELF files, though we performed our experiments
on code sections extracted solely from ELF files.
3.2 Machine Learning
We then continued with the experiment reconstruction and cross-
validation of the state of the art. For training and testing our ma-
chine learning classifiers, we used the following complete feature-
set which consists of 293 features as follows. The first 256 fea-
tures are mapped to Byte Frequency Distribution (BFD) (used by
Clemens [10]). The next 4 features map to “4 endianness signatures”
(used by Clemens [10]). The following 31 features are mapped
to function epilog and function prolog signatures for amd64, arm,
armel, mips32, powerpc, powerpc64, s390x, x86 (developed by angr
framework [47] and also used by De Nicolao et al. [15]). The fi-
nal 2 features map to “powerpcspe signatures” that were developed
specifically for this paper. 4 To this end, we extract the mentioned
features from the code sections of the ELF binaries in the sample-
sets (column Sample-sets size in experiment in Table 2). We then
save the extracted features into a CSV file ready for input to and
processing by machine learning frameworks.
In order to replicate and validate the approach of Clemens [10],
we used the Weka framework along with exact list and settings
of classifiers as used by the author (Table 3). We used non-default
parameters (acquired by manual tuning) only for neural net when
training the classifier on our complete dataset, because the parame-
ters used by Clemens [10] were specific to their dataset. We also
used only the list of architectures and features used by the author.
In order to replicate and validate the approach of De Nicolao et
al. [15], we used scikit-learn [40]. The authors used only logistic
regression classifier to which they add L1 regularization as com-
pared to Clemens [10]. In this paper, we implemented the logistic
regression classifier both in scikit-learn and Keras [9] (a high-level
API for neural networks) in order to see if the framework used has
any effect on the classification accuracy. We also used only the list
of architectures and features used by the authors.
3.3 Hardware and Software
To perform thework from this paper we usedmultiple combinations
of software, as summarized in Table 4. In terms of hardware we
used two main machines. The server used for dataset collection, and
4These signatures are in the process of being contributed back to open-source projects
such as angr, binwalk.
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Table 3: Classifiers and their settings as suggested by Clemens [10].
Model Weka name Parameters
1 nearest neighbor (1-NN) IBk -K 1 -W 0 -A "weka.core.neighboursearch.-LinearNNSearch -A "weka.core.-EuclideanDistance -R first-last""
3 Nearest neighbors (3-NN) IBk -K 3 -W 0 -A "weka.core.neighboursearch.-LinearNNSearch -A "weka.core.-EuclideanDistance -R first-last""
Decision tree J48 -C 0.25 -M 2
Random tree RandomTree -K 0 -M 1.0 -V 0.001 -S 1
Random forest RandomForest -I 100 -K 0 -S 1 -num-slots 1
Naive Bayes NaiveBayes N/A
BayesNet Bayesnet -D -Q weka.classifiers.bayes.net.-search.local.K2 – -P 1-S BAYES -E weka.classifiers.bayes.net.-estimate.SimpleEstimator – -A 0.5
SVM (SMO) SMO -C 1.0 -L 0.001 -P 1.0E-12 -N 0 -V -1 -W 1 -K "weka.classifiers.functions.-supportVector.PolyKernel-E 1.0 -C 250007"
Logistic regression SimpleLogistic -I 0 -M 500 -H 50 -W 0.0
Neural net MultilayerPerceptron -L 0.3 -M 0.2 -N 100 -V 0 -S 0 -E 20 -H 66
Neural net († this paper) MultilayerPerceptron -L 0.3 -M 0.2 -N 100 -V 20 -S 0 -E 20 -H 66 -C -I -num-decimal-places 10
Table 4: Software configurations used at various stages of
our experiments.
Type Role Configuration
Software Dataset acquisition
bash 4.2.46(2)
python 3.6.6
wget 1.14
Software ML experiments
Keras 2.2.4 (TF)
scikit-learn 0.20.0 (TF)
Weka 3.8.3
Software OpenAPI web-services python 3.5.2flask-restplus 0.12.1
Software Radare2 plugin Radare2 3.3.0python 3.5.3
data pre- and post-processing has a 4-cores CPU Intel(R) Xeon(R)
E7-8837 2.67GHz with 16 GB of DDR3, and was running CentOS 7.4
with the kernel 3.10.0-957.5.1.el7.x86_64. The host used formachine
learning tasks is a standard PC with a 6-core CPU Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-8700k 5.00GHz CPU with 12 threads, GTX 970 graphics card, 16
GB of DDR4 and was running Windows 10.
4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Classifier performance when training and
testing with code-only sections
First, we compare the performance of multiple classifiers trained
on code-only sections, when classifying code-only input. For this
we use 10-fold cross validation and the features extracted from
code-only sections of the test binaries. Also, we evaluate the effect
of various feature-sets on classification performance by calculating
performancemeasures with the “all features” set, BFD-only features-
set, and BFD+endianness features-set. We then cross-validate the
results by Clemens [10] as well as compare them to our results.
Using Weka frameworks and the settings presented in Table 3,
we trained and tested multiple different classifiers using different
feature-sets. BFD corresponds to using only byte frequency distri-
bution, while BFD+endianness adds the architecture endianness
signatures introduced by Clemens [10]. The complete data set in-
cludes the new architectures as well as the new signatures for
powerpcspe (see also Section 4.4). The performance metrics are
weighted averages, i.e., sum of the metric through all the classes,
weighted by the number of instances in the specific architecture
class. The results are also compared to the results presented by [10],
and can be observed in Table 5. We marked with asterisk (*) the re-
sults that we obtained using different parameters than those in [10].
As can be seen in Table 5, the results are inline with the ones
presented by Clemens [10], even though we constructed and used
our own datasets. In our experiments, the complete data set (with
added architectures and all features considered) increased the accu-
racy of all classifiers (in some cases by up to 7%) when compared to
the results of Clemens [10]. This could be due to a combination of
larger overall dataset, more balanced sets for each CPU architecture
class, and the use of only binaries that have code sections larger
than 4000 bytes.
4.1.1 Effect of test sample code size on classification performance.
Next, we study if the sample size has an effect on the classification
performance. For this, we test the classifiers against a test set of
code sections with increasingly varying size, as also performed by
both Clemens [10] and De Nicolao et al. [15]. If the performance
of such classifiers is good enough with only small fragments of
the binary code, those classifiers could be used in environments
where only a part of the executable is present. For example, small
(128 bytes or less) code size fragments could be encountered in
digital forensics when only a portion of malware or exploit code is
successfully extracted from an exploited smartphone or IoT device.
For this test, the code fragments were taken from code-only sections
using random sampling in order to avoid any bias that could come
from using only code from the beginning of code sections [10]. We
present the results of this test in Figure 2.
When testing with varying size of the test input, SVM performed
the best with almost 50% accuracy even with the smallest sample
size of 8 bytes. Also, SVM along with 3 nearest neighbors achieved
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Table 5: Classifier performance with different feature-sets. For comparison, we also present results from Clemens [10].
Classifier Precision Recall AUC F1measure
Accuracy
All features
(293 features)
Accuracy
BFD+endian
Accuracy
BFD+endian
Clemens [10]
Accuracy
BFD
Accuracy
BFD
Clemens [10]
1-NN 0.983 0.983 0.991 0.983 0.983 0.911 0.927 0.895 0.893
3-NN 0.994 0.994 0.999 0.994 0.993 0.957 0.949 0.902 0.898
Decision tree 0.992 0.992 0.998 0.992 0.992 0.993 0.980 0.936 0.932
Random tree 0.966 0.966 0.982 0.966 0.965 0.953 0.929 0.899 0.878
Random forest 0.996 0.996 1.000 0.996 0.996 0.992 0.964 0.904 0.904
Naive Bayes 0.991 0.991 0.999 0.991 0.990 0.990 0.958 0.932 0.925
BayesNet 0.992 0.992 1.000 0.992 0.991 0.994 0.922 0.917 0.895
SVM (SMO) 0.997 0.997 1.000 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.983 0.931 0.927
Logistic regression 0.989 0.988 0.998 0.989 0.988 0.997 0.979 0.939 0.930
Neural net 0.995* 0.994* 1.000* 0.994* 0.994* 0.919 0.979 0.940 0.940
8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1K 2K 4K 8K 16K 32K 64K
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Figure 2: Impact of the test sample size on classifier perfor-
mance.
90% accuracy at 128 bytes. Logistic regression implemented in scikit-
learn and Keras were very close performance-wise, both implemen-
tations achieving 90% accuracy at 256 bytes. Surprisingly, logistic
regression implemented in Weka under-performed and required
2048 bytes to reach 90% accuracy. Cross-validating and comparing
the result, the classifiers that performed the best in our varying
sample size experiments also performed well in the experiments
by Clemens [10]. On the other hand, in this experiments not all
the classifiers achieved 90% accuracy at 4000 bytes as experienced
by Clemens [10]. For example, at 4000 bytes the Decision Tree and
Random Tree classifiers in our case achieved accuracy of only 85%
and 75% respectively.
4.1.2 Effect of different frameworks on performance of logistic re-
gression. From all the different classifiers available, De Nicolao et
al. [15] used logistic regression only and used the scikit-learn as
their machine learning framework of choice. Logistic regression has
a couple of parameters that affect the classification performance.
The authors used grid search to identify the best value for C, which
stands for inverse of regularization strength and found the value
of 10000 to give the best results in their case. Since the dataset
itself affects the result, we ran grid search for the scikit-learn model
developed based on our dataset. The C values of 10000, 1000, 100,
10, 1, 0.1 were tested and we found that for our case the value
of 1000 gave the best results. Similarly, for the Keras model, we
found for C the value of 0.0000001 to provide the best accuracy.
The Table 6 present our results of logistic regression using 10-fold
cross-validation on code-only sections when tested in all different
frameworks.
With this experiment, for example, we found that for the same
dataset, the logistic regression implemented in scikit-learn and
Keras provided better results (F1 measures of 0.998) when compared
to Weka (F1 measures of 0.989).
Table 6: Logistic regression 10-fold cross validation perfor-
mance in different machine learning frameworks.
Classifier Precision Recall AUC F1 measure Accuracy
Weka 0.989 0.988 0.998 0.989 0.988
scikit-learn 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.996
Keras 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.997
4.2 Classifier performance when training with
code-only sections and testing with
complete binaries
We also explored how well the classifiers perform when given the
task to classify a complete binary (i.e., containing headers, and code
and data sections). In fact, De Nicolao et al. [15] tested their classifier
performance on complete binaries (i.e., full executables). Therefore,
in this work we test all the different classifiers used by Clemens [10]
and De Nicolao et al. [15] against complete binaries using a separate
test set consisting of 500 binaries for each architecture (which is
about 1.5 times more than in [15]). The classifiers we used in this
test are still previously trained using code-only sections The results
of our tests for this experiments can be seen in Table 7.
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Table 7: Performance of classifiers (in our Weka, unless specified otherwise) when trained on code-only sections and testing
on complete binaries.
Classifier Precision Recall AUC F1 measure Accuracy
1-NN 0.871 0.742 0.867 0.772 0.741
3-NN 0.876 0.749 0.892 0.773 0.749
Decision tree 0.845 0.717 0.865 0.733 0.716
Random tree 0.679 0.613 0.798 0.619 0.613
Random forest 0.912 0.902 0.995 0.892 0.901
Naive Bayes 0.807 0.420 0.727 0.419 0.420
Bayes net 0.886 0.844 0.987 0.840 0.844
SVM (SMO) 0.883 0.733 0.971 0.766 0.732
Logistic regression (Weka) 0.875 0.718 0.978 0.728 0.718
Logistic regression (scikit-learn) 0.913 0.780 0.780 0.794 0.579
Logistic regression (Keras) 0.921 0.831 0.831 0.839 0.676
Neural net 0.841 0.452 0.875 0.515 0.451
Average (De Nicolao et al. [15]) 0.996 0.996 0.998 0.996 -
Our analysis shows that Random Forest performed the best by
having the highest performance measures of 0.901 for accuracy and
0.995 for AUC. The logistic regression implemented in scikit-learn
did not perform as well as experiences by De Nicolao et al. [15]. The
time to classify all the binaries in this test set took only a couple of
seconds on all algorithms except the Nearest Neighbor algorithms
which took approximately 15 minutes. One of the reasons for this
is because the Nearest Neighbor algorithm is a lazy classifier, and
the model is only built when data needs to be classified.
We also present in Figure 3 the confusion matrix of the best
performing classifier in this test, i.e., the Random Forest classifier .
The columns represent the class frequencies predicted by the model
while the rows present true class frequencies. Everything off from
the diagonal is a misclassification. The alphabets represent the 23
architecture classes in the alphabetical order as presented in Table 2.
For example, looking at the confusion matrix it is possible to see
that the i386 (g) and the m68k (i) architectures caused over 70%
of the misclassifications. Therefore, one direction in future work
is to find the root cause of this, and develop better discriminating
signature for these architectures.
4.2.1 Testing Machine Learning as cloud implementations. In addi-
tion to the existing approaches and tools detailed above, we also em-
ployed Azure Machine Learning platform to test code-only trained
classifiers with complete binaries as input. An example of our setup
and workflow in Azure platform is presented in Figure 4, and its
(comparative) performance is presented in Table 8. In summary, the
Random Forest classifier implemented in Azure performed sensibly
better when compared to the one implemented in Weka. This once
again highlights the long-standing research challenge that, even
when using the same methods or algorithms, the implementations
do matter and can affect the research results whether in computer
science [29] or other scientific fields [18].
Figure 3: Confusion matrix of Random Forest classification
results when testing complete binaries. Columns show the
predicted class frequencies while rows show the true class
frequencies.
Table 8: Performance of Random Forest and Decision Jun-
gle classifiers trained and tested in Azure Machine Learning
platform.
Classifier Recall Precision Accuracy
Decision jungle (Azure) 0.964 0.964 0.964
Random forest (Azure) 0.974 0.974 0.974
Random forest (Weka)
(Table 7, comparison) 0.902 0.912 0.901
4.3 Classifier performance when training and
testing with complete binaries
We then verify how the training of classifiers using complete bina-
ries (i.e., not code-only sections as in previous works) affects their
performance when given complete binaries as test input. For this,
we selected some of the best performing classifiers from the previ-
ous experiments. Then we trained those classifiers with a training
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set consisting of 1000 complete binaries for each of those 23 ar-
chitectures. Finally, we tested them against a test set of 1000 full
binaries for each architecture. The results of this experiment can
be seen in Table 9. For comparison, along with the performance of
classifiers trained and tested on complete binaries, we also present
the performance of exact same classifiers when tested in code-only
experiments above.
Previous work did not propose or use complete binaries for train-
ing the classifiers, and used complete binaries only as classification
test inputs [10, 15]. As can be seen in Table 9, all the classifiers
we tested achieved over 97% accuracy, while the Random Forest
implemented in Azure platform performed the best with 99.2% accu-
racy. The proposal of using complete binaries for both training and
testing the classifiers, as well as the experimental confirmation that
the accuracy of classification is comparable to existing approaches
and is very high (e.g., up to 99.2%), is another incremental but novel
contribution of this paper to the field.
4.3.1 Discussion. Up to this point, we evaluated our “complete
binary” training and recall only using ELF format binaries, and
we presented the reasons for experimenting only with ELF format
binaries in Section 3.1. We are aware that executable binary file
formats such as PE32, COFF, MACH-O, and including ELF, even
when compiled for the same CPU architecture, may certainly have
major structural difference between each other, despite the fact
that their code sections may contain similar, equivalent or highly-
comparable op-code byte sequences. This is due to many factors,
including but not limited to file format header variations, compiler
and its options, the way the data (e.g., strings, constants, initial
values for variables) is stored in the binary file and subsequently
referenced within code sections. Such structural differences could
in turn influence both the training and the recall of the “complete
binary” method we introduced. Therefore, we plan as a future work
to further evaluate and improve the “complete binary” approach for
non-ELF-only cases such as when dealing with other homogeneous
binary format datasets (e.g., only PE32) or with heterogeneous
binary format datasets (e.g., combination of ELF, PE32, MACH-O).
4.4 The special case of signatures and features
for powerpcspe
During the testing of classifiers performance, we observed that some
architectures were the root cause behind the most false matches per-
formed by the classifiers. For example, the binary code for powerpc
(PPC) and powerpcspe (PPCspe) are essentially the same, the only
difference being the presence of SPE instructions 5 in powerpcspe
ISA. Therefore, we had to create custom signatures to be able to
more accurately distinguish between the powerpc and powerpcspe
code sequences. We created the signatures by comparing the in-
structions between the two architectures and finding unique ones
that only appear in one of the architectures. For each analyzed
architecture, the dataset for this experiment consisted of 1000 com-
plete binaries for training, and the same amount for testing. To run
this test, we employed Random Forest classifier as implement in
Weka framework, and the results are presented in Table 10.
5SPE stands for Signal Processing Engine. SPE instructions perform floating-point
operations on the integer registers.
Our analysis shows that the addition of the two additional powerpcspe
signatures increased the F1 score of Random Forest implemented
in Weka by about two percentage units. The confusion matrix for
powerpc and powerpcspe architectures without the signatures is
presented for comparison next to the confusion matrix when the
two signatures/features were used, and can be seen in Table 8.
The development and addition of the powerpcspe discriminating
features, and the experimental confirmation that they improve the
overall classification accuracy and confusion matrix, is another
contribution of this paper to the field.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we tried to bridge multiple gaps in the field of auto-
mated and precise identification of architecture and endianness of
binary files and object code. For this, we developed from scratch
the toolset and datasets that are lacking in this research space. As
a result, we contribute a comprehensive collection of open data,
open source, and open API web-services. We performed experiment
reconstruction and cross-validation of the effectiveness, efficiency,
and results of the state of the art methods by Clemens [10] and
De Nicolao et al. [15]. When training and testing classifiers using
solely code-sections from compiled binary files (e.g. ELF binaries),
all our classifiers performed equally well achieving over 98% accu-
racy. We have shown that our results are generally inline with the
state of art, and in some cases we managed to outperform previ-
ous work by up to 7%. Additionally, we provided with this work
novel contributions to the field. One contribution is the proposal
and confirmation that complete binaries can be successfully used
for both training and testing machine learning classifiers. In this
direction, we demonstrate a 99.2% accuracy using Random Forest
classifiers implemented in Azure platform. Another contribution is
the development and validation of new discriminating features for
powerpc and powerpcspe architectures. Finally, our work provides
an independent confirmation of the general validity and sound-
ness of both existing and newly proposed algorithms, features, and
approaches.
5.1 Future work
There are several directions for future work, and we plan to initially
focus on the following. First, we would like to continuously expand
the datasets in terms of size, number of supported architectures,
and quality. We plan to achieve this by using community submitted
data subsets as well as by setting up our own multi-architecture
object code building infrastructures. Second, we plan to use crowd-
sourcing in order to get community’s expert knowledge that would
continously increase the performance of machine learning classi-
fiers. One way to achieve this is to allow user to confirm or correct
automatically classified results. Third, we plan to expand the work
on architecture discriminating signatures. One idea is to develop ad-
vanced methods (e.g., based on machine learning) to automatically
create signatures for more accurate discrimination of code’s CPU
architecture, for example by using op-code specifics, and function
epilogs and prologs.
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6 APPENDICES
Listing 1: Machine learning – Code to extract and compute
feature-sets.
import r e
UNKNOWN_ARCHITECTURE = 99
ARCHITECTURES = [ ' a lpha ' , ' amd64 ' , ' arm64 ' , ' armel ' , ' armhf ' , ' hppa ' , ' i 3 8 6 ' , ' i a 6 4 ' ,
'm68k ' , 'mips ' , ' mips64e l ' , ' mipse l ' , ' powerpc ' , ' powerpcspe ' ,
Figure 4: An example of setup we used in Azure Machine
Learning platform.
' ppc64 ' , ' ppc64e l ' , ' r i s c v 6 4 ' , ' s390 ' , ' s390x ' , ' sh4 ' , ' s p a r c ' ,
' s p a r c 6 4 ' , ' x32 ' ]
def g e t _ a r c h i t e c t u r e ( argument ) :
sw i t c h e r = {
1 : { " a r c h i t e c t u r e " : " a l pha " , " end i anne s s " : " l i t t l e " , " words i z e " : 6 4 } ,
2 : { " a r c h i t e c t u r e " : " amd64 " , " end i anne s s " : " l i t t l e " , " words i z e " : 6 4 } ,
[ . . . . . . . ]
2 3 : { " a r c h i t e c t u r e " : " x32 " , " end i anne s s " : " l i t t l e " , " words i z e " : 3 2 } ,
UNKNOWN_ARCHITECTURE : " unknown "
}
return sw i t c h e r . g e t ( argument , " unknown " )
c l a s s BFD ( ) :
HEADERS_WRITTEN = F a l s e
def i n i t i a l i z e _ f i n g e r p r i n t s ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . f p s = { }
# b i g end i an one
s e l f . f p s [ " be_one " ] = b r " \ x00 \ x01 "
# l i t t l e end i an one
s e l f . f p s [ " l e _one " ] = b r " \ x01 \ x00 "
# b i g end i an s t a c k
s e l f . f p s [ " b e _ s t a c k " ] = b r " \ x f f \ x f e "
# l i t t l e end i an s t a c k
s e l f . f p s [ " l e _ s t a c k " ] = b r " \ x f e \ x f f "
# a rme l 32 p r o l o g s
s e l f . f p s [ " a rme l 32_p ro l og_1 " ] = b r " [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] \ x2d \ xe9 "
s e l f . f p s [ " a rme l 32_p ro l og_2 " ] = b r " \ x04 \ xe0 \ x2d \ xe5 "
# a rme l 32 e p i l o g s
s e l f . f p s [ " a rme l 3 2 _ ep i l o g_ 1 " ] = b r " [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } \ xbd \ xe8 \ x1e \ x f f \ x 2 f \ xe1 "
s e l f . f p s [ " a rme l 3 2 _ ep i l o g_ 2 " ] = b r " \ x04 \ xe0 \ x9d \ xe4 \ x1e \ x f f \ x 2 f \ xe1 "
# arm32 p r o l o g s
s e l f . f p s [ " a rm32_pro log_1 " ] = b r " \ xe9 \ x2d [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] "
s e l f . f p s [ " a rm32_pro log_2 " ] = b r " \ xe5 \ x2d \ xe0 \ x04 "
# arm32 e p i l o g s
s e l f . f p s [ " a rm32_ep i l og_1 " ] = b r " \ xe8 \ xbd [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } \ xe1 \ x 2 f \ x f f \ x1e "
s e l f . f p s [ " a rm32_ep i l og_2 " ] = b r " \ xe4 \ x9d \ xe0 \ x04 \ xe1 \ x2 f \ x f f \ x1e "
# mips32 p r o l o g s
s e l f . f p s [ " mips32_pro log_1 " ] = b r " \ x27 \ xbd \ x f f [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] "
s e l f . f p s [ " mips32_pro log_2 " ] = b r " \ x3c \ x1c [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] \ x9c \ x27 " + \
" [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] "
# mips32 e p i l o g
s e l f . f p s [ " m ip s 32_ep i l og_1 " ] = b r " \ x 8 f \ xb f [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } ( [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 4 } ) " + \
" { 0 , 4 } \ x03 \ xe0 \ x00 \ x08 "
# m i p s 3 2 e l p r o l o g s
s e l f . f p s [ " m ip s 3 2 e l _p r o l og_1 " ] = b r " [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] \ x f f \ xbd \ x27 "
s e l f . f p s [ " m ip s 3 2 e l _p r o l og_2 " ] = b r " [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] \ x1c \ x3c " + \
" [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] \ x9c \ x27 "
# m i p s e l e p i l o g
s e l f . f p s [ " m i p s 3 2 e l _ e p i l o g _ 1 " ] = b r " [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } \ xb f \ x 8 f ( [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] " + \
" { 4 } ) { 0 , 4 } \ x08 \ x00 \ xe0 \ x03 "
# ppc32 p r o l o g
s e l f . f p s [ " ppc32_pro log_1 " ] = b r " \ x94 \ x21 [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } \ x7c \ x08 \ x02 \ xa6 "
# ppc32 e p i l o g
s e l f . f p s [ " pp c32_ep i l o g_1 " ] = b r " [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } \ x03 \ xa6 ( [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 4 } ) " + \
" { 0 , 6 } \ x4e \ x80 \ x00 \ x20 "
# p p c e l 3 2 p r o l o g
s e l f . f p s [ " pp c e l 3 2 _p r o l o g_1 " ] = b r " [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } \ x21 \ x94 \ xa6 \ x02 \ x08 \ x7c "
# p p c e l 3 2 e p i l o g
Towards usable automated detection of CPU architecture and endianness for arbitrary binary files and object code sequences arXiv.org, pre-print, 15.8.2019
s e l f . f p s [ " p p c e l 3 2 _ e p i l o g _ 1 " ] = b r " \ xa6 \ x03 [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } ( [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 4 } ) " + \
" { 0 , 6 } \ x20 \ x00 \ x80 \ x4e "
# ppc64 p r o l o g s
s e l f . f p s [ " ppc64_pro log_1 " ] = b r " \ x94 \ x21 [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } \ x7c \ x08 \ x02 \ xa6 "
s e l f . f p s [ " ppc64_pro log_2 " ] = b r " ( ? ! \ x94 \ x21 [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } ) \ x7c \ x08 \ x02 \ xa6 "
s e l f . f p s [ " ppc64_pro log_3 " ] = b r " \ x f 8 \ x61 [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } "
# ppc64 e p i l o g
s e l f . f p s [ " pp c64_ep i l o g_1 " ] = b r " [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } \ x03 \ xa6 ( [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 4 } ) " + \
" { 0 , 6 } \ x4e \ x80 \ x00 \ x20 "
# p p c e l 6 4 p r o l o g
s e l f . f p s [ " pp c e l 6 4 _p r o l o g_1 " ] = b r " [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } \ x21 \ x94 \ xa6 \ x02 \ x08 \ x7c "
# p p c e l 6 4 e p i l o g
s e l f . f p s [ " p p c e l 6 4 _ e p i l o g _ 1 " ] = b r " \ xa6 \ x03 [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } ( [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 4 } ) " + \
" { 0 , 6 } \ x20 \ x00 \ x80 \ x4e "
# s 3 9 0 x p r o l o g
s e l f . f p s [ " s 3 90x_p ro l og_1 " ] = b r ' \ xeb . [ \ xf0 −\ x f f ] . . \ x24 '
# s 3 9 0 x e p i l o g
s e l f . f p s [ " s 3 9 0 x _ ep i l o g _ 1 " ] = b r ' \ x07 \ x f 4 '
# amd64 p r o l o g s
s e l f . f p s [ " amd64_prolog_1 " ] = b r " \ x55 \ x48 \ x89 \ xe5 "
s e l f . f p s [ " amd64_prolog_2 " ] = b r " \ x48 [ \ x83 , \ x81 ] \ xec [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] "
# amd64 e p i l o g s
s e l f . f p s [ " amd64_ep i log_1 " ] = b r " \ xc9 \ xc3 "
s e l f . f p s [ " amd64_ep i log_2 " ] = b r " ( [ ^ \ x41 ] [ \ x50 −\ x 5 f ] { 1 } | \ x41 [ \ x50 −\ x 5 f ] ) \ xc3 "
s e l f . f p s [ " amd64_ep i log_3 " ] = b r " \ x48 [ \ x83 , \ x81 ] \ xc4 ( [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 1 } | " + \
" [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 4 } ) \ xc3 "
# powe rp c s p e SPE i n s t r u c t i o n
s e l f . f p s [ " p owe r p c s p e _ s p e _ i n s t r u c t i o n _ i s e l " ] = b r " [ \ x7d−\ x 7 f ] " + \
" [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } ( \ x1e | \ x5e | \ x9e ) "
s e l f . f p s [ " p owe r p c s p e _ s p e _ i n s t r u c t i o n _ e v l " ] = b r " ( \ x10 | \ x11 | " + \
" \ x12 | \ x13 ) [ \ x00 −\ x f f ] { 2 } ( \ x01 ␣ | \ xc1 ␣ | \ xc8 ␣ | \ xc9 ␣ | \ xc0 ␣ | " + \
" \ xd0 ␣ | \ xd1 ␣ | \ xda ) "
def i n i t ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . i n i t i a l i z e _ f i n g e r p r i n t s ( )
# Bu i l d r e g e x s ou t o f f i n g e r p r i n t s
for key , v a l u e in s e l f . f p s . i t ems ( ) :
r egex = re . compile ( v a l u e )
s e l f . f p s [ key ] = regex
s e l f . b y t e _ f r e q u e n c i e s = [ ]
s e l f . f i n g e r p r i n t s = [ ]
def c a l c _ f e a t u r e s ( s e l f , a n a l y z e _ t h i s ) :
by t e_coun t = 0
# C a l c u l a t e b y t e f r e q u e n c y
by t e _ f r e quency_ coun t e r = [ 0 ] ∗ 256
for by te in a n a l y z e _ t h i s :
by t e_coun t += 1
by t e _ f r e quency_ coun t e r [ by te ] += 1
try :
b y t e _ f r e quency_ coun t e r = [ ( x / by t e_coun t )
for x in by t e _ f r e quency_ coun t e r ]
except Excep t i on as e :
print ( e )
return
# F i nd matche s f o r f u n c t i o n e p i l o g and p r o l o g f i n g e r p r i n t s
f i n g e r p r i n t s = { }
for key , v a l u e in s e l f . f p s . i t ems ( ) :
i = 0
for match in va lue . f i n d i t e r ( a n a l y z e _ t h i s ) :
i += 1
f i n g e r p r i n t s [ key ] = i / by t e_coun t
s e l f . b y t e _ f r e q u e n c i e s . append ( by t e _ f r e quency_ coun t e r )
s e l f . f i n g e r p r i n t s . append ( f i n g e r p r i n t s )
def compose_data ( s e l f ) :
d a t a = [ ]
da t a = da t a + s e l f . b y t e _ f r e q u e n c i e s [ 0 ]
for key in sorted ( s e l f . f i n g e r p r i n t s [ 0 ] ) :
d a t a . append ( s e l f . f i n g e r p r i n t s [ 0 ] [ key ] )
return da t a
def c a l c u l a t e _ f e a t u r e s ( i n p u t _ f i l e ) :
b fd = BFD ( )
b fd . i n i t ( )
b fd . c a l c _ f e a t u r e s ( i n p u t _ f i l e )
d a t a = b fd . compose_data ( )
return da t a
Listing 2: Plugin for Radare2 for binary under analysis: call
our or yours (localhost, public/private IP) web-service API;
get the detected architecture, endinanness, wordsize; set the
Radare2 internals.
import r2 l ang , r 2p ipe , r e q u e s t s
R2P = r 2p i p e . open ( )
a p i _ u r l = " h t t p : / / l o c a l h o s t : 5 0 0 0 / b i n a ry / "
ap i_key = " t e s t k e y "
def r 2 b i n a r e ( _ ) :
def p r o c e s s ( command ) :
i f not command . s t a r t s w i t h ( " b i n a r e " ) :
return 0
f i l e _ s i z e _ cmd = " iZ "
f i l e _ s i z e = R2P . cmd ( f i l e _ s i z e _ cmd )
b inary_ in_hex_cmd = " p8 ␣ %s " % f i l e _ s i z e
b ina ry_ in_hex = R2P . cmd ( b inary_ in_hex_cmd )
da t a = { " b i n a ry " : bytearray . fromhex ( b ina ry_ in_hex . r s t r i p ( ) ) }
form = { " ap i_key " : ap i_key }
try :
r e sponse = r e q u e s t s . r e q u e s t (
" POST " , v e r i f y = Fa l s e , u r l = ap i _u r l , f i l e s =data , d a t a =form )
except Excep t i on as e :
print ( " E r r o r ␣ i d e n t i f y i n g ␣ the ␣ a r c h i t e c t u r e " )
r e s pon s e _ j s on = re sponse . j s on ( )
try :
print ( " A r c h i t e c t u r e : " , r e s pon s e _ j s on [ " p r e d i c t i o n " ] [ " a r c h i t e c t u r e " ] ,
" \ nEnd ianness : " , r e s pon s e _ j s on [ " p r e d i c t i o n " ] [ " end i anne s s " ] ,
" \ nWord ␣ s i z e : " , r e s pon s e _ j s on [ " p r e d i c t i o n " ] [ " words i z e " ] ,
" \ n P r e d i c t i o n ␣ p r o b a b i l t y : " , r e s pon s e _ j s on [ " p r e d i c t i o n _ p r o b a b i l i t y " ]
)
except Excep t i on :
print ( " Unable ␣ t o ␣ i d e n t i f y ␣ a r c h i t e c t u r e " )
R2P . cmd ( " e ␣ asm . a rch=%s " % r e s pon s e _ j s on [ " p r e d i c t i o n " ] [ " a r c h i t e c t u r e " ] )
i f r e s pon s e _ j s on [ " p r e d i c t i o n " ] [ " end i anne s s " ] == " b i g " :
R2P . cmd ( " e ␣ c f g . b i g end i an = t r u e " )
e l se :
R2P . cmd ( " e ␣ c f g . b i g end i an = f a l s e " )
R2P . cmd ( " e ␣ asm . b i t s =%s " % r e s pon s e _ j s on [ " p r e d i c t i o n " ] [ " words i z e " ] )
